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Executive Summary
This report describes the development of transparency in the European wholesale energy markets.
Every year starting from 2010, the Florence School of Regulation (FSR) will publish a Transparency Report 
and assign the Energy Transparency Award. The award aims at promoting transparency best practices and 
distinguishing a European undertaking, institution or industry association for its particular contribution to 
the transparency of energy markets. The initiator and the first financing body of the Energy Transparency 
Award is RWE Supply and Trading.
   
The 2010 Transparency Report focuses on the issue of transparency in wholesale energy markets. Energy 
trading in Europe has increased considerably since liberalisation and currently involves several hundreds 
of operators. For instance, figures show that the overall volume of electricity traded via both exchanges 
and OTC almost tripled between 2000 and 2009, and that the number of total daily transactions in Europe 
- physical and financial - ranges nowadays between 6,000 and 10,000.
In this context, transparency has the important role of allowing the operators to better understand the 
market and receive correct economic signals, in a “what-you-see-is-what-you-get” fashion. As a result, tran-
sparency contributes to create competitive and well-functioning markets, which is a core goal of the Euro-
pean energy policy.
The need for coordination and information disclosure among operators playing in different countries and 
regulatory settings grows as long as the European markets become more and more interconnected. The 
example of the management of interconnection capacity shows that the choice of an adequate market 
design is fundamental to guarantee correct economic signals to market participants.
“Self-regulation” for transparency has been promoted by a number of initiatives undertaken by market and 
system operators. These include the definition of clear market conduct rules and codes, abusive behaviours 
monitoring, the provision of disclosure requirements and user-friendly and informative websites. Particular 
regard is deserved for the initiatives recently implemented by ERRA, Joint Oil Data Initiative, National Grid 
Gas, AGGM, Entso-G, Grt Gaz, Red Eléctrica de España, Gas Regional Initiative North-West, NordPool, Belpex 
and EEX.
Notwithstanding the importance of these forms of private governance, European energy markets are in 
big need of a regulatory framework ensuring the consistent implementation of common and transparent 
trading practices across Europe. The effectiveness of the current framework is jeopardised by the existence 
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of some regulatory gaps preventing the implementation of an integrated and efficient form of governance. 
The European financial regulation in place is specifically designed for financial markets, and it covers only 
energy derivatives traded at energy exchanges - which is a tiny portion of the total traded energy volumes. 
Moreover, the 3rd Energy Legislative Package does not address the specific issue of transparency in who-
lesale markets.
Since there is a clear regulatory interest in ensuring that wholesale markets are well-functioning and that 
wholesale prices and quantities are not distorted by abusive market practices, the European institutions 
are working on the development of a common set of rules. To this purpose, the Commission has presented 
a draft Regulation to the European Parliament and to the Council.
In defining a common regulation for transparency, the main challenge is represented by the need of a high 
level of coordination: firstly in order to avoid inconsistencies with the regulation already in place in the dif-
ferent countries and secondly, to integrate the three policy domains influencing the function of wholesale 
energy markets (energy as commodity, financial and carbon market).
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1. Introduction: 
The New Economic 
Approach to 
Market Transparency
1.1 The role of transparency
Transparency plays a relevant role for the energy 
industry as a whole, both at retail and at wholesale 
level. Retail transparency, in particular, helps consu-
mers making sound choices when selecting among 
the different suppliers operating in the market. Ho-
wever, efficiency and transparency of retail markets 
depend upon the organization of wholesale mar-
kets. Therefore, the present first edition of the Ener-
gy Markets Transparency Report focuses on the de-
velopment of transparency in wholesale markets. 
European wholesale energy markets involve a few 
hundred companies trading energy in Europe, 
including energy producers, large energy users, 
pure traders, investment banks and funds. Energy 
is typically traded either at exchanges or through 
over-the-counter (OTC) agreements. At the mo-
ment around 15 energy exchanges provide trading 
platforms for electricity, natural gas and carbon 
emissions. Nevertheless, the majority of energy 
in the EU is traded via OTC. For instance, statistics 
show that in 2009, 75% of electricity was traded via 
OTC, while only 25% was traded via power exchan-
ges (Europa Press Room, 2010).
Transparent wholesale markets ensure that ope-
rators have a minimum level of understanding of 
the market in which they are operating, and that 
available data (like prices and quantities) provide 
them the right signals. Hence, it plays an important 
role in promoting the market to function well. The 
effect of market transparency could be epitomised 
by the popular catch phrase “what you see is what 
you get”, meaning market transparency makes the 
relevant information available to the operators, so 
that they can more efficiently evaluate the benefits 
and costs associated with their choices.
Moreover, transparency enhances competition. 
More precisely, it creates a level playing field for 
market participants, by reducing the information 
advantage of the operators with asymmetric po-
sition or greater market power. Transparency also 
facilitates market oversight and therefore helps 
detecting abusive behaviours. As a result, transpa-
rency boosts the operators’ confidence in the pri-
cing mechanisms and in market integrity. 
The liberalisation of European energy markets of-
ficially started in 1996 and since that moment the 
need for transparency has increased. First of all, the 
liberalisation process - finally completed in 2007 - 
led to the increase in cross-border trading volumes 
and to the development of more complex and so-
phisticated markets. Second, in the current libera-
lised context incumbent operators compete with 
new entrants. 
 
As for the former argument, figures show, for in-
stance, that the overall volume of electricity traded 
via both exchanges and OTC almost tripled betwe-
en 2000 and 2009 (from 3,500 TWh to 10,000 TWh) 
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(Europea Press Room, 2010). Statistics also report 
that in 2009 the overall cross-border exchange of 
electricity among ENTSO-E members was four ti-
mes the cross-border exchange in 1975 (ENTSO-E, 
2010a).
The creation of a single EU market entails the in-
terconnection of several national energy markets, 
which need to coordinate and align in pursuing 
common objectives (Glachant and Lévêque, 2009). 
In this context, the availability of information is cru-
cial: it facilitates coordination and strengthens the 
competition among a bigger number of operators 
and national markets involved. Furthermore, the 
traditional role of operators has changed. Genera-
tors, for instance, very often operate as traders and 
retailers. Grid system operators, being responsible 
for reliability and the balance of supply, touch upon 
wholesale markets - for example, when they ma-
nage grid capacity auctions or balancing markets, 
where generators submit bids to increase or decre-
ase their production on a very short notice.
Wholesale energy markets now attract a range of 
actors including utilities, pure traders, financial in-
stitutions and other trade facilitators. It is not possi-
ble to make a perfect distinction between specialist 
traders and physical market participants as many 
pure or financial energy traders also take contracts 
for physical delivery, and some traders are subsidia-
ries or affiliates of strong physical market partici-
pants. So while traders can speculate with physical 
contracts, generators can hedge their production 
with financial contracts; in the latter case, the di-
spatch of the plant is not modified by the contract 
- the financial contract only sets the incomes of the 
plant (EFET, 2006a; EFET, 2006b). The combination 
of physical and financial transactions makes energy 
trading rather hectic nowadays. Figures show that 
the average number of total (physical and financial) 
daily transactions in Europe ranges between 6,000 
and 10,000 (Europa Press Room, 2010). Accordingly, 
there is a big need for market monitoring and for 
clear and effective rules on the information to be 
disclosed. 
The second reason why transparency is so im-
portant in liberalised energy markets relies on its 
pro-competitive function. The transition from the 
national vertically-integrated monopolies to the 
post-liberalisation European energy market produ-
ced an area where incumbent operators - holding 
consistent market power - compete with new en-
trants. The accessibility of information thus beco-
mes a particularly crucial issue: market participants 
with greater market power enjoy an information 
advantage which can be used to deter entry and li-
mit fair competition. 
The tight relationship between market monitoring, 
transparency and competition is confirmed by the 
argument advanced by Bower (Bower, 2007): lar-
ge firms operating in very concentrated electricity 
supply industries became generally more hostile 
towards the disclosure of information in the post-li-
beralisation context. This deterioration in both data 
availability and time-effectiveness was particularly 
evident in those cases where these firms were awa-
re of being scrutinised by EU regulatory authorities.
At the moment, market abuses on wholesale ener-
gy markets are not effectively prohibited. Section 4 
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shows that oversight in the EU is fragmented and 
that the existing rules only apply to few market 
places: some regulatory gaps currently prevent a 
common framework for market transparency and 
integrity.
1.2 The new “Economics of 
Transparency”
From the economic theory point of view, it is worth 
noting that at least three relevant issues related to 
market transparency have been studied by promi-
nent scientists who have recently become econo-
mics’ Nobel Laureates. Their contributions witness 
the enduring interest in the matter and set up the 
milestones for a brand new “Economics of Transpa-
rency”.
Peter Diamond, Christopher Pissarides and Dale 
Mortensen were awarded the economics’ Nobel Pri-
ze in 2010 for their analysis of markets with search 
frictions. Markets with search frictions are markets 
where the lack of relevant information prevents 
buyers and sellers from easily “matching”, i.e., fin-
ding an appropriate trading partner. These Nobel 
Laureates mainly applied their analysis on search 
frictions to the labour market: buyers and sellers on 
the labour market typically incur search costs whilst 
looking for each other. The Laureates then deliver a 
key contribution to the general economics of mar-
ket transparency which highlights the role played 
by “market design” in favouring more transparent 
coordination and trade among operators.  
A second group of economic theory development 
underlines the role of the availability of information 
in the production of efficient market outcomes. 
Friedrich von Hayek was awarded the economics’ 
Nobel Prize in 1974 for his analysis of the interde-
pendence of economic, social and institutional 
phenomena. His fundamental hypothesis on the 
role of information in the economic system led him 
to the conclusion that the information is scattered 
and that market operators only have a portion of 
it at their disposal (Hayek, 1937). Consequently, in-
formation gained a prominent role in the economic 
theory and enormously contributed to the under-
standing of market functioning. Some years later, 
Joseph Stiglitz, Michael Spence and George Akerlof 
extended the study on the role played by informa-
tion and described the markets with asymmetric in-
formation (Akerlof, 1970), which won them the eco-
nomics’ Nobel Prize in 2001. The major contribution 
of this group of scientists to the economic theory of 
transparency relies on the finding that information 
asymmetries are common in real-life economic sy-
stems and may produce detrimental effects on the 
efficiency of market outcomes and trade. 
Finally, a third group of Nobel Laureates highlighted 
the importance of the governance dimension for ef-
ficient trading: Ronald Coase (Nobel Prize in 1991), 
Douglass North (in 1993), Oliver Williamson and 
Elinor Ostrom (in 2009). First of all, they enlighte-
ned the existence of costs related to using the mar-
ket and his pricing mechanism (: the “transaction 
costs”). Second, they supported the behavioural 
hypothesis of “opportunism”, according to which an 
information advantage could be used to make pri-
vate gains while limiting efficient coordination or 
fair competition. Finally, and more generally, they 
underlined the role of institutions in creating rules 
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and incentives affecting the economic performan-
ce. A conclusion is that efficient trading requires an 
adequate form of governance as well as a credible 
and transparent regulation.    
These three scientific foundations of the economic 
nature of market transparency strongly inspired the 
logical structure of this report.
Section 2 illustrates the importance of market de-
sign in the promotion of transparent markets. The 
example of the Tri-Lateral Coupling between the 
French, the Belgian and the Dutch electricity mar-
kets shows that some organisational frameworks 
may contribute better than others to produce clear 
and reliable price signals for the operators. 
Section 3 provides an overview of European 
wholesale energy markets; following a quanti-
tative description of the markets, the work of 
the Market Observatory for Energy of the Euro-
pean Commission is presented.
Next, Section 4 describes the current European 
framework for data transparency and gover-
nance as well as current regulatory gaps which 
the European Commission is willing to fill. To 
this purpose, a proposal for a Regulation of the 
European Parliament and of the Council was is-
sued in December 2010.
Section 5 illustrates in detail the types of tran-
sparency and the current measures defined at 
the European level.
Section 6 describes how transparency is be-
nefiting from the initiatives implemented by 
market operators and Section 7 analyses the 
different dimensions of market transparency 
governance.
Finally, Section 8 presents some concluding re-
marks.
2. Market 
Transparency and 
Integration: 
Enlightening Market 
Design
The creation of a single and well-functioning energy 
market is a crucial objective of the European Union. 
Market integration and market transparency can 
both contribute to this purpose and at least to a 
certain extent may work in synergy. 
The integration of two or more markets requires a 
certain level of transparency to be achieved: in the 
context of an integrated market, operators need to 
disclose and exchange a bigger amount of infor-
mation, set common rules and homogenize codes 
and practices. The disclosure of relevant informa-
tion from the transmission system operators in an 
integrated market, for instance, affects their ability 
to accurately predict flows and efficiently manage 
cross-border capacity. Thus, it clearly represents a 
key factor in achieving an efficient allocation of the 
available capacity.
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Similarly, transparency issues become more rele-
vant when - on top of physical trading - financial 
trading is also taken into account. In this case, due 
to the combination of physical and financial regula-
tory settings, among other things there is the need 
to establish who shall be responsible for creating 
and enforcing the rules. The coordination issues 
deriving from the fact that different policy domains 
are involved in the regulation of wholesale energy 
markets in Europe are illustrated in greater detail in 
Section 7.    
If there is a relationship between the features of the 
market and the level of transparency required in or-
der to guarantee efficient market outcomes, then 
market design may have a big role in preventing 
market distortion and information manipulation. 
This is particularly evident from the comparison 
between the two mechanisms of explicit and im-
plicit auctioning in the allocation of transmission 
capacity. 
Even though national electricity price differences 
have been diminishing over time, empirical studies 
show that price convergence is only partial and 
some relevant international price differences are 
still creating arbitrage opportunities to cross-bor-
der operators. In particular, it was underlined how 
price convergences can be the result of the exerci-
se of market power and inefficient explicit auctions 
(Zachmann, 2008). 
Explicit auctions allow the auctioning of transmis-
sion capacity on an interconnector separately and 
independently from the market places where elec-
tricity is auctioned. Since the two commodities - 
transmission capacity and electricity - are traded 
separately, explicit actions are associated to rele-
vant operational risks and trading costs. First, the 
trade of the two commodities requires TSOs and 
power exchanges (PXs) to coordinate the functio-
ning of both the capacity market and the energy 
market, in a relatively short time. Second, it requires 
the operators to send their bids to the energy mar-
kets on the basis of the results of the capacity auc-
tions (Gestore del Mercato Elettrico, 2008). In fact, 
the separation of the two auctions typically leads 
to a lack of information about the respective prices 
and the auction generally provides an inefficient 
utilisation of interconnectors. 
By contrast, implicit auctions integrate capacity and 
energy markets. The resulting prices in each mar-
ket include both the cost of energy and the cost of 
congestion. Other things being equal, in this case 
the trade is more efficient - i.e., energy generation is 
oriented towards the expensive market - and ope-
rational risks and trading costs are lower. 
In 2007, the DG Competition Sector Inquiry esta-
blished that, although explicit auctioning was the-
oretically an efficient mechanism, it had shown 
efficiency deficits when compared to implicit auc-
tioning, especially when applied to not-so-liquid 
markets (European Commission, 2007). The Euro-
pean experience has indeed been increasingly pro-
ving the inadequacy of coupling markets through 
explicit auctioning methods (Glachant, 2010a), 
while showing that market coupling mechanisms 
based on implicit auctions could actually lead to 
efficient market outcomes.  
A valuable example is provided by the tri-lateral 
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market coupling between the French, Belgium and 
Dutch electricity markets (Box 1).
B1. The Tri-Lateral Market Coupling
The Tri-Lateral Coupling (TLC) was established in 
November 2006 by linking three separate power 
exchanges: Powernext (France), Belpex (Belgium) 
and APX (the Netherlands).
In the coupled market the exchanges keep opera-
ting their own order books, settlement and clearing 
arrangements as before. However, they use a com-
mon algorithm to set market clearing prices; then 
they handle their respective supply and purchase 
curves according to the overall merit order. Coupled 
markets match the highest purchase bids and lo-
west sales bids - regardless of where they have been 
introduced -, while taking directly into account the 
interconnection capacity constraints. This “coupling” 
reduces the uncertainty in the matching of energy 
market and capacity market outcomes. 
The TLC allows a rational use of existing intercon-
nections and guarantees the convergence of the 
three electricity market prices (provided there is 
no structural congestion). Finally, and most impor-
tantly, the TLC delivers clear and functional price 
signals to orientate generation towards the high 
price zones: cheaper electricity generation in one 
country can meet the demand and reduce prices in 
another country.
The TLC has produced visible effects on market pri-
ces since the very beginning: price convergence in-
creased almost immediately after its establishment 
in November 2006 (Belpex, APX and Powernext, 
2007). It was also found that apart from sharply de-
creasing hourly price differences, the creation of the 
TLC created potential for volatility reduction (De 
Jonghe, Meeus and Belmans, 2008).
The TLC case illustrates that market design may help 
sending better price signals to market operators. 
Notably, when the objective of a transparent single 
European energy market will be fully achieved - as 
already promised by the “Price Coupling of Regions” 
(Glachant, 2010b) - market participants will be of-
fered “seamless” or at least smoother and wider tra-
ding platforms.
Due to their nature of centralised organisations, PXs 
may pave the way in providing a more transparent 
framework for energy transactions vis à vis bilateral 
trading and OTC in the European energy markets 
(Moen, 2010). OTC contracts in both gas and po-
wer markets constitute the bulk of traded volumes 
in Europe (with the exception of the Scandinavian 
area). Nevertheless, since the OTC information avai-
lability is still limited by the confidential nature of 
these transactions, PXs may provide more visible si-
gnals and benchmarking for OTC contracts.
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3. Overview on 
European Energy 
Markets
3.1 A quantitative outlook
As shown in Section 1, transparency is crucial to 
energy trade efficiency. The availability of informa-
tion and long-term and stable rules, as well as the 
provision of similar legal frameworks for the ope-
rators engaged in cross-border trade, increase the 
confidence in the market and in price setting. 
A quantitative outlook on the European wholesale 
markets can be based on two major features affec-
ting market well-functioning and efficiency, namely 
liquidity and market concentration.
Liquidity can be defined as the degree to which an 
asset can be bought and sold in the market without 
affecting the price of the asset and without incur-
ring significant transaction costs. The liquidity of a 
market can be assessed by observing the volume 
or the number of trades in the market, the range of 
products available to market participants and the 
number of market participants.
Second, a well-functioning wholesale market requi-
res that there are many sellers and buyers. When the 
market is too concentrated, larger operators behave 
as price-makers and exercise (sometimes, abuse) 
their market power. The more the market is concen-
trated, the higher the scope for anti-competitive 
behaviours.   
3.1.1 Liquidity
The 2009 figures show that trading activity on the 
EU’s gas hubs and exchanges remained much “thin-
ner” compared to power markets. In contrast, in 
2009 a new trend of consolidation started for the 
European power exchanges, in particular with the 
creation of EPEX and the launch of a preliminary 
project for a pan-European price coupling by Nord 
Pool Spot, EPEX Spot and Omel (Iberian spot power 
exchange).
Table 1 shows the relevant figures concerning the 
number of trades and the total traded size in the Eu-
ropean wholesale power and gas markets in 2010.
and integrity.
In 2010 the European wholesale power and gas 
markets expanded compared to 2009. In the Euro-
pean power market the number of trades increased 
by almost 50% up to 418,000, while in the European 
gas market the number of trades increased by 48% 
up to 222,000.
The total traded size increased too. The European 
gas wholesale market was the fastest growing with 
a 52% increase from the previous year, and reached 
a size of 4.9 million GWh. Considering an average 
price of €13.51/MWh, the estimated annual value 
of the traded market approximated at €67 billion. 
The 52% increase represents a relative slowdown 
in grow from the 115% increase witnessed in 2009 
with regard to 2008. Nevertheless, in absolute terms 
the growth experienced in the last two years is si-
milar. 
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As for the European electricity market, a growth 
of 19% reaching 4.8 million GWh compared to the 
previous year was registered in 2010. Applying an 
average price of €44.78/MWh, the estimated annual 
value of the traded market reached up to €219 bil-
lion. Differently from the gas trend, the 19% growth 
in the electricity market represents an important 
result compared to the 9% increase in traded size 
registered in 2009 (Financial Services Authority, 
2010). 
3.1.2 Market concentration
 
In 2009, a slight reduction in concentration in the 
electricity wholesale market - in terms of dispo-
sal of capacity - could be observed. To a different 
extent, a decrease in market concentration (mea-
sured through the HHI Index) was registered in 10 
European countries. The tendency was particularly 
evident in Belgium, Slovenia and Slovakia. Never-
theless, as shown by Table 2, market concentration 
finally exhibited moderate levels only in 7 Member 
States: Finland, Poland, the UK, Spain, Italy, the Ne-
therlands and Austria.
Concentration in wholesale gas markets remained 
high. In 10 Member States the three largest gas 
wholesalers were holding a market share greater 
than 90%. Moreover, only in 5 countries the share 
of the 3 biggest companies (in terms of available 
gas) decreased compared to the previous year: 
Belgium (-7.4%), France (-0.97%), Hungary (-5.9%), 
Italy (-1.5%) and Spain (-9%) (European Commis-
sion, 2010f ). 
Number of 
trades in 2010
Increase 
from 2009
Traded size in 
2010 (GWh)
Increase 
from 2009
Electricity 418,000 50% 4,884,571 19%
Gas 222,000 48% 4,924,378 52%
Data source: Financial Services Authority, 2010
HHI Countries
Very highly concentrated HHI > 5000 BE, FR, GR, LV, LU, SK
Highly concentrated 1800 < HHI < 5000 CZ, DE, LT, PT, SI, RO, HU, DK, NO
Moderately concentrated 750 < HHI < 1800 FI, PL, UK, ES, IT, NL, AT
Data source: European Commission, 2010f
T1. Number of trades and traded size of European wholesale energy markets
T2. Concentration in the European electricity market (HHI by capacity)
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3.2 The Market Observatory for 
Energy 
The Market Observatory for Energy was established 
in 2008 within the European Commission. It pursues 
the aims of promoting transparency and contribu-
ting to the selection of effective policies, through 
the monitoring and analysis of the European ener-
gy markets development. The Observatory’s most 
important tool is EMOS (Energy Market Observation 
System), a warehouse hosting the data relevant to 
the European energy markets.
EMOS provides data related to the EU and its Member 
States, the candidate countries and other European 
countries which are fundamental for policy-making 
at EU-level, plus essential data on other world pla-
yers, such as the biggest producing countries. The 
data features different reporting time-frames (daily, 
monthly, quarterly and yearly) and in some cases in-
cludes historical series. The issues on which EMOS 
focuses on range from demand and supply deve-
lopments to trade volumes, to wholesale and retail 
prices on physical and financial markets. The Obser-
vatory also monitors the oil stock situation in light 
of the security of supply issue.
With regard to wholesale prices, the analysis of the 
Observatory shows that in 2010 the wholesale elec-
tricity market was rather volatile, while wholesale 
gas prices in 2010 showed a lower level of volatili-
ty and followed a typical seasonal trend, increasing 
in the last part of the year (Market Observatory for 
Energy, 2010c).
As for price levels, the Pan-Euro day-ahead base-
load index reached up to €60/MWh in October 2010 
and €70/MWh in December 2010, and sensibly de-
creased in early January 2011. The UK NBP day-ahe-
ad index reached up to €25/MWh in late December 
(Market Observatory for Energy, 2011). 
The Observatory produces a number of EMOS-ba-
sed publications, including Annual Reports, Oil Bul-
letins, as well as Quarterly Reports on Electricity and 
Gas Markets.       
The Quarterly Reports on European Electricity Mar-
kets analyse the recent developments in electricity 
markets (wholesale and retail) across Europe; the 
final part of the Report generally focuses on a speci-
fic issue, such as market transparency. Similarly, the 
Quarterly Reports on European Gas Markets over-
view the recent developments in gas markets (who-
lesale and retail). Overall, the Quarterly Reports al-
low monitoring price trends and identifying those 
situations where distorted or manipulated price si-
gnals are sent to market operators (Box 2). 
B2. Quarterly Reports on European electricity 
and gas markets (Q2 2010)
The Quarterly Report on European electricity mar-
kets for Q2 2010 (April to June 2010) illustrates some 
cases of extreme volatility: Sardinia and Sicily’s pri-
ces (Appenine peninsula) were far from the national 
prices and presented some extreme price move-
ments. Particular attention is also dedicated to the 
case of Greek electricity prices, since both base-lo-
ad and peak-load day-ahead power prices showed 
a sudden jump in April. The Report concludes that 
the exceptional drop in the indigenous electricity 
generation might have in turn affected the demand 
for imports of power. 
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The Quarterly Report on European Gas Markets for 
the same period relates the worse-than-usual wea-
ther conditions which pushed gas prices up in May. 
In contrast, temperatures were relatively milder 
in the UK, which could favourably trade with the 
continent. Nevertheless, the report highlights that 
market fundamentals do not provide all the neces-
sary explanations for the high gas prices. There is 
a possibility that artificially high levels of demand 
were brought into the market by financial opera-
tors. 
The current Observatory structure departs to a cer-
tain extent from the original project proposed by 
the European Commission in 2002. The proposal 
of a distinct entity dedicated to market monitoring 
and analysis was finally rejected and the Observa-
tory developed as an internal function within DG 
Energy.   
The first step towards the implementation of the 
Observatory dates back to 2004, when the Euro-
pean Parliament adopted a preparatory action to 
explore the establishment of an observation entity. 
The preparatory action included the development 
of EMOS in order to collect and optimize the infor-
mation provided by the different institutions ope-
rating in statistics and collection of data across Eu-
rope (such as Eurostat, International Energy Agency 
and Platts). The information would then be presen-
ted in order to facilitate both data analysis and the 
identification of the major issues of the European 
energy system, as well as to support efficient policy 
decisions. In line with the Parliament preparatory 
action, in the 2007 Communication on “An Energy 
Policy for Europe” the Commission proposed the 
creation of an Energy Observatory within its premi-
ses. As a result, the Market Observatory for Energy 
started operating in 2008. 
There is some scope to improve the role currently 
played by the Observatory as a collector of infor-
mation and monitoring tool. First of all, in terms of 
accessibility of the collected data. The architecture 
of EMOS is such that the information included in 
the database is transformed and aggregated. Ne-
vertheless, due to security reasons, direct access to 
the database is limited to the system administra-
tors from the Observatory. Thus, in case of specific 
queries on the data, final users can only address the 
Observatory by writing to a dedicated email ad-
dress.
By contrast, the development of more sophisti-
cated system integrity and security mechanisms 
could enhance the accessibility of the information, 
and open it to market operators. In turn this would 
also require more attention to be paid to the level 
of user-friendliness of the website.
Finally, the scope of EMOS could be extended. The 
database is currently mainly focused on electricity, 
gas and oil, while the evolution of the EU energy 
mix as well as the implementation of sustainable 
energy policies would require its scope to be exten-
ded, for instance, to renewable energy sources.
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4. European 
Framework for Data 
and Governance
4.1 The position of the European Com-
mission 
Well-functioning and competitive wholesale mar-
kets reflect on the overall performance of the ener-
gy sector. First of all, it is well-known in the regula-
tory practice that prices established at the level of 
traded markets work as a benchmark for the retail 
prices paid by household and industrial consumers. 
According to Ofgem, for instance, wholesale costs 
account for around 60% of a customer’s energy bill 
and are a major factor affecting suppliers’ retail pri-
cing decisions (Ofgem, 2009a).  
Second, wholesale prices in the energy sector 
show where energy prices are high and where they 
are low, and therefore send signals for future in-
vestments in energy infrastructure.
The two arguments above clarify the reason why 
there is a regulatory interest in ensuring that the EU 
wholesale prices are not distorted by abusive mar-
ket practices and lack of transparent rules.
The transparency issue was at first put under scru-
tiny by the European Commission in 2007. The DG 
Competition of the European Commission issued 
the Final Report of its Energy Sector Inquiry and 
unhesitatingly concluded that the benefits deriving 
from an increase in the accessibility of the informa-
tion were overweighting the risk of possible nega-
tive side effects: “The existing lack of transparency 
means that it is more necessary to enhance transpa-
rency than to limit it.” (European Commission, 2007). 
The side effects which the Commission was referring 
are the loss of confidentiality and the risk for collu-
sive outcomes. Undertakings might indeed suffer 
from disclosing strategic information. It may also be 
a concern that excessive transparency could facili-
tate collusion between market players and produ-
ce, for instance, parallel bidding and other similarly 
coordinated arrangements detrimental to markets. 
More generally, a collusive potential is associated to 
information exchanges among firms, as well as to all 
those practices increasing the observability of pri-
ces and quantities or helping firms monitoring each 
other’s behaviour (Motta, 2004). 
The two potential drawbacks highlight that alrea-
dy at a high level of information there is a trade-off 
between transparency and the risk for market abu-
se. Nevertheless, at a lower level of information, in 
light of the large extent to which markets may be-
nefit from transparency, the European Commission 
adopted a very clear position: “There is a lack of 
transparency in most Member States. (...) More tran-
sparency is needed.” (European Commission, 2007). 
That conclusion appeared consistent with the view 
of relevant institutions, such as the Council of Eu-
ropean Energy Regulators, the former European As-
sociation of Transmission System Operators and the 
European Federation of Energy Trading.
4.2 The existing framework
The issue of energy markets transparency is to a 
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different extent affected by three pieces of Europe-
an legislation, namely the Market Abuse Directive 
(MAD), the Markets in Financial Instruments Direc-
tive (MiFID) and the 3rd Energy Package. 
Markets Abuse Directive (MAD), 2003: Directive 
2003/6/EC provides a common framework for the 
disclosure of information to the market and aims 
at the prevention, detection, investigation and 
sanctioning of insider trading and market mani-
pulation. Nevertheless, the MAD is designed for 
financial markets only. Physical products (such as 
spot energy market products) are not covered by 
the MAD, while derivatives are covered only if they 
are admitted to trading on a regulated market. The 
present scope of the MAD does not apply to any 
OTC trades including standard OTC transactions, 
which represent the bulk of traded electricity and 
gas markets in Europe.  
Markets in Financial Instruments Directive (MiFID), 
2004: Directive 2004/39/EC provides with investor 
protection and market oversight over investment 
service activities carried out by investment firms. 
This objective is not important for energy mar-
kets since energy derivatives are typically not in-
vestment products: they are rather primarily used 
as hedging instruments for mitigating price risks. 
The MiFID also ensures free competition and re-
gulatory supervision in trading venues establi-
shed in different Member States, and provides re-
quirements to ensure fair trading and appropriate 
transparency for shares admitted to trading on a 
regulated market. However, these transparency 
obligations do not apply to commodity derivatives. 
Neither the spot market nor the non-standardised 
physical OTC transactions are covered by the defini-
tion of a financial instrument in the Directive. 
3rd Energy Legislation Package, 2009: The 3rd Le-
gislation Package (Regulation (EC) No 713/2009, 
Regulation (EC) No 714/2009, Regulation (EC) No 
715/2009, Directive 2009/72/EC and Directive 
2009/73/EC) entered into force in March 2011. It 
aims at promoting a fully functioning and compe-
titive internal market where consumers have more 
choice and pay competitive energy prices. Greater 
transparency and competition plus strengthened 
security of supply are two of the main objectives of 
the package. In order to increase market transpa-
rency, the package includes a range of disclosure 
provisions and codifies a record holding obligation 
for supply undertakings on all trading transactions 
for 5 years. That information is supposed to be ac-
cessible for competent authorities (MiFID regula-
ted entities are exempted). Moreover, very broad 
wholesale market monitoring duties are identified 
for National Regulatory Authorities and for the 
newly-established Agency of Cooperation of Ener-
gy Regulators (ACER).
Since the MAD and the MiFID are designed for fi-
nancial markets, only energy derivatives traded at 
energy exchanges are covered by these Directives. 
In figures this means that a portion equal to 16% of 
the total traded volumes of electricity is covered by 
these rules (Europa Press Room, 2010).
At the same time, the 3rd Energy Package does not 
assess the issue of the provision of information clo-
ser to real time, the provision of more detailed in-
formation on individual infrastructure or the cove-
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rage of CO2. More generally, it does not specifically 
address the issue of transparency in energy whole-
sale trading markets.
4.3 Filling the regulatory gaps
The European Commission recognised the need to 
fill the regulatory gaps deriving from the financial 
regulation (MAD and MiFID) and the 3rd Package, 
and started exploring possible options for a new 
tailor-made market transparency and integrity fra-
mework. 
The definition of a tailor-made regulation for whole-
sale energy markets will supposedly achieve a dual 
purpose: first, it will provide an integrated regula-
tion covering all of the transactions taking place in 
European wholesale energy markets and not only 
a portion of them; second, it will take into account 
energy-specific market abuses. An example of 
energy-specific market abuse is the withholding of 
generation capacity from the market. Since market 
prices are highly sensitive to the availability of gene-
ration capacity, prices can promptly increase when 
capacity is withheld. This is particularly true in the 
electricity markets, due to the impossibility to store 
electricity on an industrial scale. Nevertheless, to a 
lesser extent the same concern also applies to the 
gas markets (as with transportation capacity). 
Apart from the economic and regulatory arguments, 
the involvement of the European Union in the pre-
paration of a common transparency framework ap-
pears the most appropriate also from a purely legal 
point of view.
The EU action is justified on grounds of subsidiarity 
since energy markets are cross-border in nature and 
transactions may be executed in different places 
than where energy is delivered. Thus, a regulatory 
initiative from a single Member State or from some 
Member States would not be sufficient to address 
the entire issue. The EU action is also justified sin-
ce the objectives of the proposed action could not 
be achieved sufficiently by the Member States (this 
is the Necessity test): trading platforms are located 
all over the EU and Member States initiatives would 
suffer possible divergences and would create legal 
uncertainty. On the contrary, a European legislative 
intervention would be able to produce a single set 
of rules and increase the legal certainty for all of the 
market participants in the EU markets (this is the EU 
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Added Value test). 
The new regime on market transparency and inte-
grity is supposed to include three items (European 
Commission, 2010d):
  Identification of efficient transparency mea-
sures: focussing on the relevant data to be pu-
blicly available and assessing whether existing 
provisions on information disclosure are suffi-
cient;
  Definition of insider trading and market ma-
nipulation: establishing common grounds for 
regulatory intervention and deciding whether 
financial regulation is applicable to energy 
markets;
  Regulatory monitoring and enforcement: set-
ting up a common regulatory framework, defi-
ning which regulatory authority is best suited 
to be responsible for energy markets and enfor-
cing the regulation on data availability.   
While the second and the third items represent the 
European Commission’s area of intervention and 
define the scope for the new Regulation on Ener-
gy Market Integrity and Transparency (REMIT), the 
European Regulators Group for Electricity and Gas 
(ERGEG) was asked to support the Commission 
with regard to the identification of efficient tran-
sparency measures. 
The action paths followed by ERGEG and by the 
European Commission towards the definition of a 
new regime for transparency and integrity in the 
European energy markets are reported in Sections 
4.3.1 and 4.3.2, respectively.
4.3.1 ERGEG’s action path
ERGEG and ENTSO-E, Florence Forum, June 2010: 
During the 18th meeting of the Florence Forum 
on 10-11 June 2010, ERGEG and ENTSO-E (Europe-
an Network of Transmission System Operators for 
Electricity) renewed their support to the Commis-
sion initiative of the public consultation on mar-
ket integrity in energy trading. In light of the fact 
that ERGEG was invited by the European Commis-
sion to give advice on a legally-binding guideline 
concerning fundamental data transparency rules 
in electricity, ERGEG and ENTSO-E confirmed their 
intention to work in close cooperation. The two or-
ganisations assumed the transparency rules in the 
Northern Regional Initiative as a starting point and 
focussed on discussing and comparing both re-
quirements and definitions. They highlighted that 
all published data must be relevant to the market 
and that there is a need for a homogeneous defini-
tion for each item all over Europe. Moreover, they 
highlighted the importance of a central pan-Euro-
pean transparency platform, compatible with the 
existence of regional and local websites adapted to 
local needs. 
ERGEG, December 2010: Following a public consul-
tation of stakeholders, on 7 December 2010, ERGEG 
presented its advice to the European Commission 
on Comitology Guidelines on Fundamental Electri-
city Data Transparency. The document contains a 
proposal of the requirements for publishing infor-
mation on generation, load, transmission, intercon-
nections and balancing, and it also clarifies the role 
of the central platform responsible for the publica-
tion of all of the relevant electricity data. The details 
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of ERGEG’s advice are spelled out in Section 5.2. 
Finally, with specific regard to the gas market:
ERGEG, September-November 2010: In the gas sec-
tor, legally binding transparency requirements are 
currently most detailed for transmission systems, 
while transparency requirements for LNG and stora-
ge facilities are currently covered by the 3rd Package 
and in ERGEG’s Guidelines for Good Practice (GGP). 
Additionally, the 3rd Package offers the possibility 
to develop comitology guidelines for storage and 
LNG transparency. In order to evaluate the market 
need for further transparency requirements - excee-
ding the legally binding transparency requirements 
in Regulation (EC) 715/2009 and Directive 2009/73/
EC - ERGEG published a public consultation concer-
ning a list of all existing transparency requirements 
and called for comments. The consultation process 
closed on 26 November 2010. More details are re-
ported in Section 5.2.2.
4.3.2 European Commission’s action 
path
The legislative initiative of the European Commis-
sion on transparency and integrity of traded energy 
markets was finally issued in early December 2010, 
though its foundations go back to December 2007.
January 2009: The potential gaps in the regulato-
ry framework of electricity and gas wholesale mar-
kets were already recognised by the Commission 
during the preparatory phase of the 3rd Package. 
In December 2007. In the context of the 3rd Ener-
gy Package proposals, the former DG Tren issued a 
joint mandate to the Committee of European Secu-
rities Regulators (CESR) and to the European Regu-
lators Group for Electricity and Gas (ERGEG) to seek 
advice on transparency in electricity and gas supply 
contracts and derivatives. Their mandate requested 
joint advice on whether the existing securities regu-
lation was sufficiently addressing market integrity 
in the electricity and gas markets. ERGEG and CESR 
advised the Commission that the current securities 
regulations (MAD and MiFID) were not sufficient. 
They recommended all EU trading platforms to 
publish harmonised anonymous post-trade infor-
mation, on a trade-by-trade basis and close to real-
time (15 minutes at most). That information would 
be requested for all standardised electricity and gas 
supply contracts as well as for derivatives traded on 
or cleared through these platforms. Data would be 
published by all platforms, from regulated markets 
to broker platforms, and would be accessible on a 
non-discriminatory and reasonable commercial 
basis. ERGEG and CESR also suggested that regular 
reporting on trade transactions would be a helpful 
tool to monitor the integrity of the market. 
December 2009: DG Energy published a draft di-
scussion paper, and presented it at both the Floren-
ce Forum (December 2009) and the Madrid Forum 
(January 2010). The draft discussion paper concer-
ned the several issues which had to be addressed 
by the incoming legislation: definitions, commodi-
ty scope, transactional data, fundamental data and 
monitoring models. 
Definition of insider dealing and market manipula-
tion: The discussion paper highlights the need for 
definitions of insider dealing and market manipu-
lation in cases where MAD does not apply. Howe-
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ver, since energy markets transactions involve both 
physical and financial contracts, these definitions 
would need to be consistent with those of MAD. 
The coordination between the new European regu-
lation for transparency and integrity and the MAD 
is pivotal to ensure the well-functioning of energy 
markets. 
Commodity scope: The discussion paper poses the 
question of whether it would be desirable to go 
beyond electricity and gas. There is a clear trade-
off between the consideration of cross-commodity 
inter-linkages, suggesting the inclusion of the car-
bon market, and the higher complexity of the legal 
and institutional design which would be required 
in that case.
Transactional data: First, the discussion paper pre-
sents the issue of determining whether the record 
keeping obligations codified under the 3rd Packa-
ge would provide a solid enough basis. Second, the 
discussion paper suggests that as long as transac-
tions are already reported by MiFID and MAD regu-
lation, such transaction reports would need to be 
made available to the market monitor. Finally, the 
record keeping obligation set up in the 3rd Packa-
ge also poses a problem with regard to the EU ETS 
market, since there are no national regulators of 
the European carbon market who would be natural 
recipients of data on carbon market transactions. 
Accordingly, it is important to assess whether there 
is scope for an extension of the duties of national 
energy regulators.
Fundamental data: The discussion paper refers to 
the legal possibility offered under the 3rd Package 
to codify disclosure obligations for fundamental 
data through comitology (i.e., the approval of new 
detailed EU bidding rules in a process where the 
representatives of Member States vote at qualified 
majority). One of the issues to assess is the differen-
tiation of disclosure regimes between electricity 
and gas. On the one hand, a harmonised regime 
would seem preferable, while on the other hand, 
there are some physical features of the two com-
modities which may suggest a different approach. 
Furthermore, the external dimension also repre-
sents an important topic, with particular regard to 
the carbon market. The European disclosure requi-
rements regime has to determine how to deal with 
the fact that most of the operators in the carbon 
market compete with companies in other parts of 
the world, which would not be subjected to the 
same transparency obligations. 
Monitoring models: The discussion paper suggests 
that there is a fundamental choice to make betwe-
en a subsidiary oversight - based on the competen-
ces of Member States regulatory authorities - and 
a centralised oversight. The latter case envisages a 
European body monitoring all standard wholesale 
transactions in spot and derivatives products on all 
European markets. This duty would be compatible 
either with the creation of a brand new regulato-
ry body or with an extension of the responsibilities 
currently foreseen for the Agency for the Coopera-
tion of Energy Regulators (ACER). 
May-July 2010: DG Energy published a full public 
consultation on measures to ensure transparency 
and integrity of wholesale markets in electricity and 
gas. The consultation process started on 31 May 
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2010 and ended on 23 July 2010, and included a lar-
ge number of items (19). As a result, 51 exploitable 
answers were provided by a variety of stakeholders.
 
December 2010: Following the public consultation, 
DG Energy finally issued a draft Regulation on Ener-
gy Market Integrity and Transparency (REMIT) on 8 
December 2010. If adopted by the European Parlia-
ment and by the Council, the Regulation will aim at 
ensuring market transparency by obliging energy 
wholesale operators to respect clearer market rules.
In particular, the draft Regulation prohibits the use 
of inside information, i.e., it requires price sensitive 
information to be disclosed before trades take pla-
ce, as well as all sorts of information manipulation 
providing misleading signals to the market.
The Regulation also requires market participant to 
provide ACER with a record of their transactions. 
The form, exact content and timing of the informa-
tion will be established in the future through speci-
fic acts of the Commission, based on the guidelines 
developed by ACER. In any case, ACER guidelines 
will provide for several channels for the reporting 
data, in order to avoid double reporting for those 
operators already covered by the MAD obligations. 
Finally, market monitoring plays a crucial role in the 
draft Regulation. Market monitoring will be mainly 
the responsibility of ACER. The Regulation provides 
for ACER to gather, review and share data, while na-
tional regulators will be responsible for detailed in-
vestigation of suspected abuse. Nevertheless, given 
the cross-border nature of energy markets, ACER 
has a duty of cooperation with national authorities 
especially with regard to the need to share relevant 
post-trade data and ensure that suspected market 
abuses are treated consistently all over Europe. The 
coordination between ACER and national autho-
rities will be particularly important in those cases 
where an investigation covers several Member Sta-
tes. 
Finally, as for the gas market: 
November 2010: On 11 November 2010, the Com-
mission’s Decision on new transparency rules for 
the European gas market was published in the Of-
ficial Journal (Decision OJ L 293/67). The Decision 
has applied since 3rd March 2011, i.e., the day when 
all provisions of the 3rd Energy Package came into 
effect. The Decision aims at improving transparency 
of the European gas transmission network. TSOs will 
have to publish information on the availability and 
use of network capacity, in standardised formats and 
units, and this information will have to be updated 
at least every day. Moreover, TSOs will have to pu-
blish a detailed and comprehensive network code 
outlining the rights and responsibilities of all users, 
containing information about the different services 
they provide and the different types of transporta-
tion contracts available for those services.  
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5. Methodology
5.1 Types of transparency
The data dimension in the issue of transparency 
is of crucial importance and concerns three main 
aspects: fundamental data, trade data and record 
keeping. 
Fundamental data transparency is also called “pre-
trade transparency”, since it allows the disclosure of 
the information on physical data - such as networ-
ks, generation, storage and consumption - which 
operators shall gather before trading. For instan-
ce, data transparency allows for the disclosure of 
information on all sorts of situations leading to a 
foreseeable change in the available capacity, such 
as planned outages, restrictions, expansions or di-
smantling of capacity. This information represents 
a prerequisite for efficient trading choices and the-
refore shall be publicly available.  
Trade transparency, also known as “post-trade tran-
sparency”, allows access to information on previous 
wholesale transactions. Transparency requirements 
in this case include the publication of information 
on the price and the quantity exchanged as well as 
bid curves. 
Finally, record keeping obligations provide for a 
certain amount of information to be available also 
in the medium-long term. Trade transparency and 
record keeping clearly represent a relevant tool for 
market monitoring and they are therefore one of 
the main aspects which the EU is currently fo
cussing on. The previous section showed that the 
3rd Legislative Package for the EU energy markets, 
implemented since March 2011, includes some 
provisions to increase post-trade transparency and 
codifies a record keeping obligation of 5 years for 
supply undertakings on all trading transactions. 
Moreover, the previous section also reports that 
post-trade transparency obligations play an impor-
tant role in the draft Regulation recently proposed 
by the European Commission.
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5.2 How to measure transparency
The identification of different types of transparency 
does not solve the most fundamental problem of 
establishing how to measure transparency and as-
sessing whether a certain given level of transpa-
rency is sufficient or not. 
Some consensus has been reached on the initiative 
of ERGEG, which tried to define general guidelines. 
Sections 5.2.1 and 5.2.2 illustrate the transparency 
requirements upon which there is a general agre-
ement that they provide a benchmark to which to 
compare the actual provisions of European markets. 
5.2.1 Data transparency in the 
electricity sector
ERGEG issued its advice on the Comitology Guideli-
nes on fundamental electricity data transparency in 
early December 2010. The Guidelines aim at establi-
shing a common level of fundamental data transpa-
rency, defining a minimum level of data publication 
and developing a central platform to collect all of 
the relevant information on European wholesale 
energy markets. In general, the document contains 
a proposal on the disclosure requirements to be ap-
plied with regard to load, transmission, generation, 
interconnections and balancing activities. A sum-
mary of the main provisions follows hereafter.
Platform: The advice provides for an important role 
to be played by ENTSO-E, with regard to both the 
development of clear and common definitions for 
each data item and the establishment of the central 
platform for publishing the information specified 
in the guidelines. The required information would 
be disclosed on the common (European) platform 
without undue delay; it would be accessible, user-
friendly, free of charge and published in English. 
Moreover, the information would be updated on a 
regular basis, expressed in consistent units and fi-
nally stored for at least 5 years.  
Load: TSOs shall be responsible for providing:
  Hourly actual total load at the latest one hour 
after the operational hour;
  Day-ahead estimate of the total load per bid-
ding area;
  Week-ahead, month-ahead and year-ahead 
estimate of the total load per bidding area (if 
applicable);
  Year-ahead forecast margin (difference betwe-
en yearly forecast of available generation ca-
pacity and yearly forecast of total load) per bid-
ding area;
  Ex-ante and ex-post information on any change 
(planned and unplanned, respectively) on the 
availability of consumption units, if the change 
equals or exceeds 100 MW and lasts at least one 
market time unit. Ex-ante information shall be 
published as soon as possible and at the latest 
one hour after the decision is made, while ex-
post information shall be published and upda-
ted as soon as possible and at the latest one 
hour after the outage, or, in any case when an 
update is available.
In those cases where the primary owners of the data 
are DSOs, consumption units and generation units, 
there is an obligation to provide the TSOs with all 
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the data required to fulfil the disclosure obliga-
tions. TSOs are then responsible for collecting and 
sending the relevant data about load on their con-
trol area to the central information platform.   
Transmission and Interconnections: TSOs shall 
provide annual information on expansion and di-
smantling projects in their national transmission 
grids per bidding area with the estimated impact 
(MW) - also with regard to the interconnection ca-
pacity - at least concerning the three following ye-
ars. This information must be given when the effect 
equals or exceeds 100MW at least during one mar-
ket time unit. Moreover, the TSOs shall provide:
  Information on planned outages on intercon-
nections between bidding areas and in the 
transmission grid that reduce interconnection 
capacity if the estimated impact on capacity 
equals or exceeds 100MW;
  Ex-post information on actual outages (both 
planned and unplanned) with an impact equal 
or exceeding 100MW;
  Offered capacity, in case of an explicit transmis-
sion capacity auction;
  Offered day-ahead capacity, in case of an impli-
cit auction;
  For each border between bidding areas and 
per direction, estimated net transfer capacity 
for the next day, for the next week, for the next 
month and for the next year;
  Estimated hourly available transmission capaci-
ty for the next day for the intra-day market;
  Information on any restrictions placed on the 
use of available cross-border capacity.
Further disclosure requirements concern the TSOs 
or Transmission Capacity Allocators in case of expli-
cit auctions and for cross-border explicit auctions, 
and in case of flow-based allocation of capacity.
Generation: Generators are responsible for provi-
ding ex-ante information on the total sum of gene-
ration capacity installed for all existing production 
units equalling or exceeding 1MW installed capa-
city, for three following years per production type. 
Moreover, they shall provide:
  Installed gross capacity annually for the three 
following years for each production unit (in-
stalled and planned) with an installed capacity 
equal to or greater than 100MW;
  Ex-ante forecast of available capacity annually 
for the three following years for each produc-
tion unit (installed and planned) with an instal-
led capacity greater than 100MW;
  Ex-ante information on planned unavailability 
of generation units if the change in the availa-
ble capacity is equal to or greater than 100MW;
  Ex-post information on unplanned unavailabili-
ty of generation units with a change equal to or 
greater than 100MW in available capacity;
  Estimated aggregated information per market 
time unit on the total scheduled generation per 
bidding area for each hour of the following day;
  Ex-post information for the previous week on 
the filling rate of the water reservoir and hydro 
storage plants;
  Actual unit by unit generation output detailed 
per generation unit of each production unit 
equal to or greater than 100MW installed gene-
ration capacity, updated every hour;
  Actual aggregated generation output per mar-
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ket time unit and per generation type;
  Ex-ante forecast of day-ahead generation of 
wind power and solar power for each bidding 
area per each market time unit for the following 
day in countries with more than 1% feed-in of 
wind or solar power generation per year or for 
bidding areas with more than 5% feed-in of this 
type of generation per year.
Balancing: TSOs or operators of balancing markets 
shall provide at least the information on:
  Rules of balancing including the processes for 
the ex-ante and real-time procurement of diffe-
rent types of balancing power reserves;
  Amount of reserved balancing reserves (if appli-
cable);
  Process of ex-ante capacity reservations paid to 
generators and the price methodology (if appli-
cable);
  Ex-post aggregated offers for activation to the 
TSOs, separated for each type of reserve;
  Ex-post information on the activated balancing 
reserves;
  Ex post information on actual prices paid by 
TSOs for balancing energy;
  Imbalance prices for balancing time unit;
  Volumes of the aggregated imbalances; finan-
cial balance of the control area on a monthly 
basis;
  Market information on the type of balancing 
bids/offers used for each day of the month.
If applicable, the TSO shall provide additional data, 
such as volumes of exchanged bids and offers per 
procurement time unit, maximum and minimum 
process of exchanged bids, volume of balancing 
energy activated in various control areas with joint 
cross-border balancing. 
Monitoring: National regulatory authorities are re-
sponsible for ensuring compliance with the guide-
lines regarding the obligations placed on TSOs, ge-
nerators, consumption units and DSOs. The Agency 
for the Cooperation of Energy Regulators shall en-
sure compliance with these guidelines regarding 
the obligations places on ENTSO-E. Moreover, the 
Agency is in charge of reviewing the efficiency 
and cost-effectiveness of the central information 
platform on a yearly basis. This assessment will be 
based on a report to be sent by ENTSO-E.
5.2.2 Data transparency in the gas 
sector
ERGEG was invited by the European Commission to 
give advice on a draft guideline concerning funda-
mental gas transparency (Section 4.3.1). Accordin-
gly, in October 2010 ERGEG launched a public con-
sultation on existing transparency requirements for 
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natural gas, in order to assess the need for further 
transparency requirements exceeding the legally 
binding transparency requirements in Regulation 
(EC) 715/2009 and Directive 2009/73/EC.
The consultation was closed on 26 November 2010 
and 33 responses were received. Stakeholders were 
invited to express their own opinion with regard to 
transparency in gas transmission, LNG, gas storage 
and gas production. In particular, they were asked 
whether the existing legally binding transparency 
requirements for transmission, LNG and storage 
satisfied their needs as market participants and 
whether they were satisfied with the current level 
of transparency provided by system operators. Mo-
reover, they were asked whether the non-binding 
transparency requirements included in the Guide-
lines for Good Practices for LNG System Operators 
and in the Guidelines for Good Practices for Storage 
System Operators were sufficient and whether they 
should become legally-binding. 
Legally binding requirements:
Regulation (EC) 715/2009 on conditions for access 
to the natural gas transmission networks: TSOs shall 
publish the relevant information on a website ac-
cessible to the public, free of charge and update the 
information on a regular basis. Information should 
be provided in a user-friendly manner and be clear, 
quantifiable and in English. TSOs shall publish their 
network codes and the standard conditions on the 
rights and responsibilities of all network users, the 
rules on balancing and the methodology for the 
calculation of imbalance charges. Further disclosu-
re requirements include, for instance:
  Technical capacity for flows in both directions; 
actual physical flows;
  Planned and actual physical flows;
  Amount of gas in the system at the start of each 
gas day and the forecast of the amount of gas 
in the system at the end of each gas day per ba-
lancing zone, updated on an hourly basis;
  Effective records of all capacity contracts.  
The same Regulation also provides for LNG and Sto-
rage disclosure requirements concerning all rele-
vant information, in particular: data on the use and 
availability of services, subject to the monitoring of 
such publication by the NRA; information regarding 
the services offered and the relevant conditions ap-
plied; the amount of gas in each system or group 
of storage facilities, and the available capacities (in-
cluding those exempted from third party access).
 
Directive 2009/73/EC concerning common rules for 
the internal market in natural gas: With regard to 
LNG and storage operators, NRAs or Member Sta-
tes shall define and publish the criteria according 
to which the access regime applicable to storage 
facilities is determined. Moreover, system operators 
are required to publish their main commercial con-
ditions for the use of storage, linepack and other 
ancillary services on an annual basis. 
ERGEG’s non-binding guidelines:
Pilot Framework Guideline on Capacity Allocation 
on European Gas Transmission Networks (2010): 
The guidelines suggest that the network code shall 
define standard communication procedures that 
are applied by TSOs to exchange information with 
network users and that TSOs publish the detailed 
European Energy Markets Transparency Report 201026
capacity allocation procedure as well as the offered 
capacity, its lead time and its duration. 
Guidelines for Good Third Party Access Practice for 
LNG System Operators, GGPLNG (2008): The termi-
nal code shall include the main standard conditions 
for each service outlining the rights and responsibi-
lities of the system operator, capacity allocation me-
chanisms and auction terms (if applicable). GGPLNG 
also proposes maps to indicate the location of LNG 
facilities, the description of the infrastructure and 
the connection points of the LNG facility with the 
downstream infrastructure. Further disclosure re-
quirements include tariffs and tariff methodologies 
for each offered service, existing and future LNG ter-
minal capacity, maintenance plans, and data on the 
use and availability of services. 
Guidelines for Good Third Party Access Practice for 
Storage System Operators, GGPSSO (2005): Accor-
ding to the GGPSSO, SSOs should implement user-
friendly systems to publish the relevant information 
on the Internet in a timely manner. Information shall 
be clear and accessible; users may request the SSO 
not to publish information about the aggregate use 
of storage only in the case such publications would 
harm the commercial interest of users. Neverthe-
less, in case of non-publication, the NRA could re-
view the decision not to publish. Tariffs and tariff 
methodologies shall be published ex ante in case of 
regulated TPA; in case of negotiated TPA the main 
commercial conditions including the prices for stan-
dard services shall be available once and in case of 
proposed and actual damages. In any case, informa-
tion shall be disclosed with regard to:
  Services offered;
  Main storage standard conditions;
  Storage capacity allocation;
  Congestion management;
  Charges applicable to storage penalties;
  TSO’s pre-emptive rights with operational rules 
and processes;
  Maintenance periods that can affect storage 
users’ rights from storage contracts and the cor-
responding operational information: during the 
maintenance period, SSOs shall regularly pu-
blish updated information on details, expected 
duration and effect of the maintenance.
Finally, every day, SSOs shall provide information 
on stock levels in each storage facility, aggregate 
inflows and aggregate outflows and percentage of 
capacity available per SSO or aggregated by all of 
the hubs.  
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6. Pro-transparency 
Initiatives
Market platforms and market operators can con-
tribute to increase transparency. Transparency 
benefits from the implementation of disclosure 
requirements and increases as long as the accessi-
ble information is provided more time-effectively, 
more frequently or in more detail. Transparency 
also benefits from specific design strategies for tra-
ding platforms, allowing a more straightforward in-
terpretation and use of the relevant data. 
A number of recent initiatives contributed to in-
crease data transparency in the European energy 
markets. These initiatives particularly involve asso-
ciations of regulatory authorities and other organi-
sations, system operators - singularly and in coope-
ration - as well as power exchanges.
6.1 Associations of regulatory bodies 
and other organisations
Energy Regulators Regional Association (ERRA): 
ERRA is a voluntary organisation of energy regula-
tors from the Central European and Eurasian region, 
with affiliates from Asia, the Middle East and the US. 
It was created in 2000 to support the improvement 
of energy regulation and the development of sta-
ble and independent national regulatory authori-
ties. ERRA has contributed to transparency through 
publications and the organisation of specific trai-
nings. Moreover, the ERRA Energy Tariff Database 
collects the information concerning the official 
electricity and gas tariffs in 19 countries (including 
Russia, Turkey, Ukraine, Poland, Hungary) and pro-
vides further relevant data on energy markets, such 
as consumption and generation.
Joint Oil Data Initiative (JODI): JODI was created 
in 2001 by six pioneering organisations (APEC, Eu-
rostat, IEA, OLADE, OPEC and UNSD) to address the 
issue of lack of data transparency in oil markets - 
contributing to excessive price fluctuations -. JODI 
provides data on monthly oil consumption and pro-
duction which would be difficult if not impossible 
to access otherwise. The data is submitted by the 
national authorities of the participating countries. 
Nowadays, more than 90 countries, all members of 
the six organisations (representing more than 90% 
of global oil production and consumption) are con-
tributing to JODI. 
6.2 System Operators
The initiatives of National Grid Gas, AGGM, ENTSO-
G and GRT Gaz in the gas sector and of Red Electri-
ca in the electricity sector, contributed to push vo-
luntary innovation on data scope, data format and 
user-friendly tools.
National Grid Gas: The major pro-transparency 
initiative promoted by National Grid Gas is the “Eu-
ropean Transparency Project” (ETP). The ETP was 
launched in May 2010, as a specific framework de-
signed to facilitate the implementation of the tran-
sparency obligations arising from the 3rd Energy 
Package. Some key features of the ETP are: the co-
operation with other TSOs via ENTSO-G for a com-
mon data set; the publication of data beyond the 
scope of 3rd Package requirements, plus greater 
granularity and frequency for certain data, and the 
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ability to send data to other IT systems and publi-
shing platforms, such as the ENTSO-G Transparency 
Platform. Finally, the transparency project also de-
livers an improvement in the graphics package to 
enable users to view data graphically. The project 
envisaged the early deliver of the new obligations 
(15 November 2010 as opposed to the required im-
plementation date of 3 March 2011). 
A further relevant feature of National Grid’s tran-
sparency policy is the publication of live (real time) 
within-day flows.  This is one of National Grid’s most 
popular reports: during 2009 the real time flow data 
registered several million downloads, the majority 
of which were automated downloads utilising Na-
tional Grid’s API facility. API (Application Program-
me Interface) allows downloading data automati-
cally and in different formats, such as csv and xml. 
Austrian Gas Grid Management (AGGM): AGGM is 
the independent system operator for the Austrian 
domestic gas grid in the East Control Area, the big-
gest of the three control areas in Austria. AGGM’s 
contribution to energy markets transparency deri-
ves from the application of transparency standards 
which are higher than the legal requirements of 
the Austrian Gas Act and concern the information 
on the system utilisation at all entry-exit points of 
the East Control Area. Among other things, AGGM 
also publishes statistical information as well as in-
formation specifically dedicated to new market par-
ticipants, concerning procedures and guidelines, in 
order to provide assistance and advice. 
European Network of Transmission System 
Operators for Gas (ENTSO-G): In November 2008, 
ENTSO-G launched a central platform called “Tran-
sparency Platform” (TP). The TP provides both a 
consistent picture of the access regimes to gas 
transmission in the EU and dynamic data on capa-
city, nominations and re-nominations, commercial 
flows and interruptions per cross-border and cross-
balancing zone. All data is presented in the same 
units and according to common principles concer-
ning, for instance, the timeline of data submissions. 
Moreover, the TP offers a noticeable tool which ena-
bles the user to look for available commercial rou-
tes to transport gas across the whole European gas 
grid. This is possible thanks to an exclusive, techno-
logically advanced model that is able to take into 
consideration all commercial frameworks for access 
to the transmission systems. Finally, TSOs are able 
to send information through a user-friendly input 
mask that automatically generates .xml messages. 
GRT Gaz: GRT Gaz transports gas to the public di-
stribution system and to industrial customers in 
France. With its 32,000 km of network it represents 
one of the most important gas transporters in Eu-
rope. GRT Gaz’s contribution to transparency relies 
on the fact that its website provides relevant data 
on the network, such as gas exchanges at the vir-
tual points, capacities, maintenance programmes, 
consumptions, gas commercial flows at the cross-
border interconnections and balancing activities. 
All data are published and updated on a daily ba-
sis. The website also provides charts, graphs, maps, 
different exports or RSS feeds. Finally, all of these 
data can be directly accessed from the home page 
of GRT Gaz by clicking on the specific button “Key 
Transmission Figures”.
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Red Electrica de España (REE): The mission of the 
Spanish transmission electricity system operator 
(REE) establishes that all its commitments should 
be accomplished in a transparent framework. The 
REE web page is available in Spanish and in En-
glish and reports all current operating procedures, 
demand, wind forecasts and real time data. There 
are three main remarks highlighting REE’s contribu-
tion to the transparency. First of all, REE’s website 
also includes information from neighbouring mar-
kets (Portugal and France). Second, REE developed 
a simulator tool that allows users to calculate the 
cost of their international transactions through the 
website with ease.
Finally, starting in 2007, the three TSOs of the south-
west region of Europe (REE, RTE and REN) have been 
coordinating their efforts in the framework of a re-
gional initiative. The topics on which the three TSOs 
are working include transparency and information 
management, as well as possible market coupling 
mechanisms and a possible balancing scheme for 
the whole region. It is worth noting that in Septem-
ber 2008 the Regulatory Authorities of the three 
interested countries issued a Transparency Report 
concerning information management and whole-
sale data handling in the south-west region. The 
report concluded that transparency in the region 
improved considerably and there is potential for 
further enhancements with regard to information 
handling and disclosure. 
6.3 Electricity and Gas Regional 
Initiatives
Electricity and Gas Regional Initiatives (ERIs and 
GRIs, respectively), launched by ERGEG in Spring 
2006, are considered an interim step towards the 
creation of single EU electricity and gas markets. 
Transparency is indeed one of the main “statutory” 
priorities for all of the ERIs and GRIs and different 
initiatives have been taken in this respect. 
In recent years, all of the current 7 ERIs have issued 
a transparency report containing uniform transpa-
rency requirements for the market operators. In 
the North ERI, for instance, - including Denmark, 
Finland, Germany, Norway, Poland and Sweden - a 
Transparency Report was already issued in 2007, 
and two Transparency Monitoring Reports were is-
sued in 2008 and in 2010.  In the FUI ERI, - including 
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France, the UK and Ireland - a Consultation Paper on 
wholesale Market Transparency was issued in 2007, 
even though priority was finally given to the two 
issues of balancing and congestion management 
policies in the period 2008-2009. The other ERIs (Bal-
tic, Central-East, Central-South, Central-West and 
South-West) issued a Transparency Report between 
2008 and 2010. Also the 3 GRIs (North-West, South 
South-East and South) implemented some pro-
transparency initiatives.
Among all of the Regional Initiatives, the Gas Regio-
nal Initiative North-West (GRI NW) is the one which 
overall most substantially contributed to the deve-
lopment of transparency.
Gas Regional Initiative North-West (GRI NW): The 
Gas Regional Initiative North-West includes nine 
countries and is the largest of the three Gas Re-
gional Initiatives in terms of both market size and 
geographic scope. The improvement of transpa-
rency was one of the GRI NW’s priorities, especially 
following the results of the DG Competition Ener-
gy Sector Inquiry, which concluded that the lack of 
information on the availability of gas transmission 
and storage capacity was one of the main shortco-
mings in the wholesale market. 
Transmission transparency benefited from the TSOs’ 
commitment to publish a list of deliverables inclu-
ding technical capacity, probability of interruptions 
as well as daily flows and interruptions and historic 
gas flows. TSOs were also able to broadly agree on 
the format and units in which to publish the infor-
mation. The list of information requirements pro-
duced by network users, jointly with EFET and IFIEC 
(International Federation of Industrial Energy Con-
sumers), actually represented the starting point for 
the European Commission comitology proposal to 
improve European gas market transparency. The Eu-
ropean Commission’s comitology proposal indeed 
extended the progress made by TSOs in the GRI NW 
and established it as a minimum level of transpa-
rency required across the whole of Europe. 
As for storage transparency, in order to respond to 
the concern of gas security of supply and facilita-
te an early implementation of the 3rd Package re-
quirements, the members of the GRI NW initiative 
agreed to publish daily information on storage le-
vels, storage inflows and storage outflows starting 
from December 2009.    
6.4 Trading platforms
Among the European trading platform, Nord Pool, 
Belpex and EEX provided exceptional contributions 
to the development of both pre-trade and post-tra-
de transparency. 
Nord Pool Spot (NPS): NPS runs a single energy 
market for Norway, Denmark, Sweden and Finland 
and it is owned by the Nordic transmission system 
operators. In 2009 NPS covered 72% of the Nordic 
consumption. NPS holds a leading position as the 
largest exchange for electrical energy in Europe, 
with 330 companies from 20 different countries tra-
ding.
It is generally recognised that NPS’s expansion and 
success are clear indications of its efficiency and of 
the high degree of confidence of market partici-
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pants. NPS’s pioneering role in the improvement of 
market transparency is confirmed by the fact that 
more than 12 years ago, Nord Pool (now NPS) was 
already implementing web distribution of hourly 
production, consumption, export and import, ba-
lancing market data, day-ahead spot market and 
long-term financial electricity contract data from 
its organized markets. The level and timing of data 
distribution at the time were already fulfilling most 
of the requirements established by EU Directives 
and Regulations in place today. 
Still nowadays, the extent and the detail of the pu-
blished information represent a major strength of 
NPS transparency policy. The disclosure require-
ments provide disclosure of any information rela-
ting to the Nordic electricity market regarding their 
business or facilities for all participants, and in par-
ticular information on facilities for production, con-
sumption or transmission of electricity (planned 
and unplanned outages, limitations, expansions or 
dismantling of capacity from 6 weeks to 3 calendar 
years following) as well as any other information 
that is likely to have a significant effect on prices. 
The participants’ disclosure of information is provi-
ded electronically to NPS through the Urgent Mar-
ket Messages (UMM). Disclosure shall at least inclu-
de information on:
  Affected geographical area or interconnection;
  Relevant generator, station or line;
  Time of decision or occurrence of outage;
  Available capacity to the market before, during 
and after the event;
  Starting time of the planned or unplanned ou-
tage, and the corresponding stop time;
  Cause of the event.
A complementary role in ensuring the high tran-
sparency standards in NPS is played by internal 
market monitoring. The market surveillance inter-
nal function monitors trading activities and price 
formation in the spot, intraday and financial mar-
kets, regularly publishes reports and investigates 
possible breaches of laws and regulations. If the 
investigation concludes that rules were violated, 
the market participant will be sanctioned by NPS 
through oral warning, written warning or a viola-
tion charge of up to (the equivalent of ) €310,000. 
In relation to investigations, in cases where the 
market participant does not comply with the duty 
to provide information on request by NPS, a daily 
charge can be imposed until the information is pro-
vided. Market monitoring also involves the energy 
regulators and the competition authorities of the 
four countries, which are under a full mandate to 
handle any question of market abuse in relation to 
the competition law that arises. All of the authori-
ties involved are supposed to collaborate for mar-
ket well-functioning.
In 2010, Nord Pool Spot was awarded the first Ener-
gy Transparency Award. 
Belpex: Belpex is the Belgian power exchange 
which in 2006 contributed to the launch of the 
first continental market coupling: the Tri-Lateral 
Coupling (Section 2). Belpex and the market cou-
pling strongly contributed to the development of 
transparency in the Belgian market and provided a 
valuable benchmark for future market integration 
at the EU-level. Furthermore, Belpex’s contribution 
to transparency also relies on the disclosure of re-
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levant information, such as day-ahead price, hourly 
available capacities and hourly flows between Bel-
gium and France and between Belgium and the 
Netherlands. Also historical data in terms of prices, 
volumes and aggregated curves are freely available. 
European Energy Exchange (EEX): EEX was esta-
blished as a result of the merger of the two Ger-
man power exchanges in Frankfurt and Leipzig 
in 2002 and currently offers a trading platform to 
191 participants from 19 different countries. Today 
the platform covers the German and the Austrian 
electricity wholesale market areas, but there is a 
potential for expansion to additional bidding areas 
or countries in the future. The major EEX strength in 
terms of transparency is represented by the infor-
mation provided by its website, which goes beyond 
the scope of the legal requirements and is presen-
ted in a user-friendly way. The website includes data 
regarding installed generating units and planned 
and actual production by generating units, inclu-
ding wind and solar generation units. Moreover, 
the website contains data on installed and available 
capacity broken up into different types of energy 
sources.
Special attention is dedicated to the design of the 
data publication. All data is presented through 
graphs such as bar or circle diagrams, in order for 
the information to be more easily interpreted. A 
menu control right next to the graphs offers the 
users the possibility to filter the information and 
display it so that it can be downloaded. Moreover, 
the menu offers access to extensive historical data. 
Another positive remark on EEX concerns the fact 
that 80% of the platform uses voluntary information 
and that operators are given the possibility to send 
updates at all times in addition to the initial repor-
ting at fixed and mandatory times.
Finally, an interesting contribution to transparency 
is provided by the existence of plausibility checks 
and very high security standards. Plausibility checks 
offer a technical and logical validation of the repor-
ted data to avoid mistakes: in case of a non plausi-
ble report, the data provider gets a message that his 
reported data set is not accepted by the system, so 
that he has the chance to correct his message. Secu-
rity standards are guaranteed through the existence 
of a Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) which provides 
digital certificates for user identification. The digital 
certificates protect the communication channels 
between the user and the transparency platform 
and minimises the probability of interception or 
manipulation of reported data. 
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7. Market Governance 
Governance consists of setting rules and related 
enforcement mechanisms. According to this defini-
tion, the governance of transparency in European 
wholesale energy markets can be analysed from a 
three-dimensional point of view. The three dimen-
sions are the level of governance, the policy do-
main and the nature of the enforcer. 
7.1 Level of governance
Governance of transparency combines at least two 
fundamental “layers” of governance: national and 
supranational. The creation of EU-wide regulation 
represents a form of supranational governance. It 
also provides centralised governance since com-
mon rules and enforcement are centrally provided.
 
In practice transparency governance in the EU 
functions in a multi-level frame in which the dif-
ferent levels interplay and compete in creating or 
implementing rules. Given the absence of a perfect 
allocation of tasks, information and power in mul-
ti-level forms of governance, it could be the rival-
ry between the various levels of rules which cure 
the imperfections of certain levels (Brousseau and 
Raynaud, 2006; Meeus, 2010). Nevertheless, the 
existence of multiple levels of governance may also 
generate overlaps and heterogeneity and thus calls 
for a higher level of coordination, through both for-
mal rules and informal arrangements (Manganelli, 
Nicita and Rossi, 2010), as we have actually been 
seeing in the European Union pace of change since 
2007.
7.2 Policy domain
The second dimension of the governance for ener-
gy market transparency combines three policy do-
mains, namely sector-specific energy regulation, 
financial regulation and carbon market regulation 
(Glachant, Ahner and de Hauteclocque, 2010). The 
tight link among the three domains derives from 
the fact that nowadays wholesale energy markets 
are highly hybrid and organise transactions which 
involve different types of trade.
Several examples of interrelations have been hi-
ghlighted with the draft discussion paper publi-
shed by DG Energy in December 2009. First, due 
to the hybrid nature of energy markets, it is very 
important to ensure the coordination between 
the new European regulatory framework for tran-
sparency and integrity and the already existing 
financial regulation against market manipulation 
and abuse. Second, the existence of commodities’ 
inter-linkages suggests the inclusion of the carbon 
market in the proposal. In this case though, further 
coordination issues would arise. For instance, the 
record keeping obligation established in the 3rd 
Package would pose a problem since there are no 
national regulators of the European carbon market 
who would be natural recipients of the post-trade 
data on carbon market transactions. 
As shown by these examples, the main challenge 
with regard to this dimension of transparency go-
vernance is the need for coordination among dif-
ferent European policies and different action lines 
which have developed separately so far.
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7.3 Nature of enforcers
The last governance dimension concerns the fact 
that private and public governance compete to 
create rules and to enforce them. Section 6 show-
ed to what extent market operators may contribute 
to increase the level of transparency. From an insti-
tutional point of view, market conduct rules, non-
binding grid codes, internal regulations and internal 
enforcement mechanisms could represent valuable 
forms of “private institutions” or “self-regulation”. All 
these initiatives shape the private dimension of the 
governance for market transparency.     
Public authorities’ activity of law-making, regulation 
and enforcement provides the public-side of gover-
nance instead. As reported in the previous sections, 
the European institutions are currently working on 
the definition of a common regulatory framework 
for wholesale energy markets’ transparency. To this 
purpose, the Commission issued a draft Regulation 
for the European Parliament and for the Council in 
December 2010. That draft regulation asks to prohi-
bit the use of inside information and the manipu-
lating practices in wholesale energy markets, and 
provides some post-trade transparency obligations. 
Moreover, it establishes a market monitoring fun-
ction within ACER and a duty of collaboration with 
national regulation authorities.
However, the work is still in progress. Since the draft 
regulation will have to be adopted by the Europe-
an Parliament and by the Council, there is still some 
degree of uncertainty on both the final outcomes of 
the Commission proposal (the content of the draft 
could be amended) and its implementation time-
line.
As a result, the extent of the future contribution of 
public governance to the development of energy 
markets transparency is not given yet. 
8. Concluding
Remarks
Transparency allows operators to have a better un-
derstanding of the market and to receive better 
price and quantity signals. Therefore, it provides a 
fundamental contribution to the creation of com-
petitive and well-functioning EU wholesale energy 
markets.
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This report highlighted a number of noticeable 
pro-transparency initiatives undertaken by market 
actors. These include the definition of clear market 
conduct rules and codes, abusive behaviours moni-
toring, as well as the provision of user-friendly and 
informative websites. All of these actions represent 
forms of private governance and heavily contribute 
to the development of transparency in the energy 
wholesale markets in Europe.
Nevertheless, energy trading is in big need of a 
regulatory framework ensuring the consistent im-
plementation of common and transparent trading 
practices across Europe.
In fact, the development of adequate public go-
vernance is still a work in progress. The current fra-
mework exhibits some regulatory gaps, which the 
European Commission is willing to fill in order to 
establish a common set of rules for all wholesale 
energy markets. To this purpose, a draft regulation 
has been presented to the Parliament and to the 
Council in December 2010. However, at the mo-
ment there is uncertainty about the final content of 
the regulation which will be eventually adopted, as 
well as about the time-line of the entire legislation 
process.
In any case, the main challenge to the definition 
of an efficient ordering of European energy mar-
kets transparency is clearly the need of a higher 
level of coordination (Vasconcelos, 2009). First of 
all, more coordination is needed to avoid overlaps, 
deadlocks and inconsistencies among the existing 
rules set at both national and trans-national level. 
Second, more coordination is needed with regard 
to the three policy domains affecting the regula-
tion of wholesale energy markets: energy-specific 
regulation, financial regulation and carbon market 
regulation. These three policy domains have de-
veloped through separate action lines and imple-
menting paths so far, thus a serious effort should be 
directed at coordinating and integrating the tran-
sparency interdependencies among them.
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